Multi-sectarian or multi-ethnic societies face an existential problem that makes them vulnerable to divisions or civil wars, which makes them face many challenges in creating an appropriate political system through which they overcome the tendency for division or local wars. Consensual democracy is an alternative to coercive states under which these divisions often flourish whenever that state weakens or collapses Broad coalition, mutual veto, relativism, and sectoral independence.
In the sense of representing sectarian, ethnic or other segments in the political process instead of excluding the minority from the majority (majority democracy).
This model was originally created in Europe, in multiethnic countries where representative democracy is difficult to implement, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and after World War II, this model was adopted in similar countries outside Europe, as p .sh. like India, South Africa, Malaysia, Colombia, Lebanon and Iraq After the fall of Saddam’s regime.
To focus on two important models, a question was recently raised about: Why did this model succeed in Malaysia, for example, and fail in Lebanon? Some analysts attribute this change to two important factors: economic growth and prosperity in line with political transformation in Malaysia, and the approval of the parties in this consensus Democratic Party of armed militias as the military wing of the political party, as happened in Lebanon and is happening now in Iraq. In this case, armed conflict violates the principle of political accommodation of the sects or races that make up society. On the other hand, the complexity of the sectoral structure and the constant change of its balance and dependence on external interventions, made this model fail at all levels, while the political stability and lack of association of components in Malaysia with a power of exterior, made this model largely successful.
While European success is mainly due to the secular terrain on which consensual democracy is built, and seems necessary for a society in which there are many sects, just as it is necessary to build a democracy in a sect-free state, in which religion is separate from politics, and its constitution and laws are subject to the innovations of human progress and that urbanization produces proportional values of the nature of the age.
Within this consociationism required by the state constitution, alliances between political forces or party coalitions can occur, injecting the principle of majority and majority in this type of democracy, as happened a tactical alliance between the Free (Christian) Patriotic Movement in Lebanon and Hezbollah (Shiite) In the face of this competition, the principle of mutual veto, which is the ultimate weapon in the possession of minorities vis-.-vis large coalitions, may be the right of mutual veto set out in the constitution, as in Austria. , or custom is not defined as in Switzerland and the Netherlands, or mixed, as in Belgium. This precaution is similar to what happened in Libya, which requires, in the event of a constitutional referendum or presidential election, to get more than 50% in each region, regardless of the overall majority in the country, as a result i fear of majority domination in one of the regions.
So, consensual democracy is a concept based mainly on the principle of constitutional quotas and quotas are the core of all political initiatives in Libya based on regional rather than sectarian divisions (although some religious currents treat society as if they were another sect in that ), so theoretically – and I emphasize the word (theoretically) In Libya, there is a dysfunctional hybrid of a majority democracy adopting the principle of domination and a consensual democracy adopting the principle of regional quotas.
While the recently proposed or drafted constitution, presented in a referendum in Libya, encounters several different objections, some do not see it as a consensual democracy that explicitly guarantees in its texts the separation of powers and wealth between regions. in a manner similar to an unofficially proclaimed federal. system, while some oppose it in terms of freedoms, or the article on Islamic law, and although no sect in Libya is threatened by this principle, which makes it surprising its emphasis, in turn, presents a blow to the door of freedoms required by any modern constitution and which is supposed to constitute the significant change for the change that took place in Libya.The second opposition relates mainly only to the elite.
Overview Libya is an Islamist-ruled state in the west and the military in the east, and a division between the two models in the south, and there are complex details within this picture, from other polarizations within the same regions as we are witnessing now. in Tripoli, but the tripartite regional concern faced the procedures for establishing the nation-state since its independence and posed an obstacle for the first envoy from the United Nations, who returned to the General Assembly to confirm that the state could only are created according to a federal system, contrary to what is provided in the (unified) decision for granting independence, and a commission was appointed to draft the constitution according to equal parts between the three regions. All commissions were subject to this tripartite quota, and the Committee also faced the problem of the capital, so the first constitution provides for two capitals in the west and east.
All successive councils of ministers were formed according to regional quotas, and then the coercive state that ruled for four decades failed to alleviate this secret obsession that continued to linger within the layers of this sometimes national or international system. the central bank and the oil establishment, the dualism of centralization and marginalization constituted the food of regional anxiety during these totalitarian decades, and the masses’ theses, neither the dispersal of conferences and popular municipalities on earth, nor the mobilizing media apparatus, the songs. and applause, did not overcome it, but the obsession of Arab unity replaced every thought.in mechanisms or rights towards a solid national unity.
After the February revolution, the obsession has continued to be active since the formation of the Transitional Council and its Executive Office, and despite the flirtation that took place between different cities and parties during the revolution, the intoxication flew quickly and the idea came again. , to work vigorously and with the fading of the force of coercion, it led to civil wars and reciprocal hate speeches. the emotional denial that still raises slogans will not work.
Sings about unity and a social structure, or other broken cylinders that will not change the reality of the situation as long as strategies and plans are not developed that deal with this reality and aim in the long run to achieve national fusion, at most. Important pillars, diversification of revenue sources, spatial development and improvement of relations with all other areas will be reflected in domestic relations by activating other sources of income that permeate the regions, such as tourism, foreign investment, transit trade , clean energies, and others.
Only a middle class, union and party formations and a new system of relations and interests will penetrate this old obsession, as a whole, transcending internal boundaries and penetrating horizontally on all sides, and all of which it guarantees time and constitutional amendments that will respond to these variables.
The current constitution, which is being debated by two regional councils, one of which belongs to the East and the other to the West, has not dealt at all with this existential dilemma which it has denied, and has sunk into it with wax wings. will be repeatedly melted into the heat of this vast geography that clearly needs a consensus card that strengthens its return to economic well-being Available if the state is sustainable.
In general, the rich Lebanese democracy that fascinated the Arabs for several decades has almost disappeared and the reason, as we mentioned, is the adoption of this model, which succeeded in Europe and Malaysia, for the approach of the armed militia in Lebanon. with which no representative or liberal democracy succeeds because the militias transfer the conflict to a war controlled by the weapon of influence.
And because it turns into a representative for external forces interfering in internal affairs. Unfortunately, the Libyan experience after the great change that took place turns into a worse model, as I have mentioned more than once that armed gangs in Libya do not even rise to the level of being a militia and because, with the exception of of some ideologies. groups, they do not belong to a sectarian or ethnic base, but often regional or tribal or city-related, and this kind of complex submission that will penetrate with weapons into any ambition towards consensual or representative democracy, will be the frightening obstacle for state-building, any kind of state.
Our only difference from Lebanon is the oil, which is spent for everyone and still preserves the face of our currency, but this situation will not last long, as the oil itself turns into a political card that everyone plays with, closed by whoever he. wants and opens from whomever he wants, while all international interventions do not see In this country, nothing but the brilliance of this black pitch and crisis management on its part is linked to its future and the future of the deposit gas leak in Libya threatening other markets.